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T

here is ample talk today about the need
to respect the environment. People are
encouraged to recycle, to save energy,
to eat organic. Governments are working to reduce their respective country’s carbon
footprint, funding renewable energy projects,
and trying to further develop public transportation. There is even talk these last couple decades
of a new ethical field: Environmental Ethics.1 This
new field tries to make the
case that it is not only humans who have rights, but
animals, plants, and nature
at large. There is a need,
according to this new field,
to develop in people a renewed respect for the environment as an end in itself
and not only as a means to
an end. The environment
is not only there to serve
our needs, according to the
proponents of an environment ethics, but has value
in itself, is an end in itself.

for people to sustain themselves and make a living. There are plenty of development scenarios
where environmental concerns conflict with the
needs of people to make a living. On a more global level, one thinks of the obvious cases of India
and China striving for development and thus increasing their own carbon footprint. Should we
deprive these people of the right to development
in the name of environmental conservation? If
we are to respect the environment as an end in itself
how far should this respect
go? Should it be limited by
concerns for people’s survival, to concerns of social
justice, or should we raise
environmental concerns
above those needs?

What about cases in which
the preservation of the
environment runs against
and sometimes supersedes
the need for people to
sustain themselves and
make a living?

But how far can we go in this respect? What of
cases where the preservation of the environment
runs against and sometimes supersedes the need
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These questions stem
from a view which deems
environmental concerns
and social justice as separate and conflictual dimensions. But must we
see things in this perspective? Can one not think of these two domains as
connected? This article will attempt to show that
social justice and environmental concerns are not

only inter-connected, but that the latter rests on
the former; that one cannot have an environmental ethics without first having developed a sense
of justice. But in order to make this case we must
first define the concept of ethics.
Ethics describes the structure of a relationship
which does not take the other as a means to an
end, but as an end in itself. Such a relationship is
qualified as respectful.2 Respect is thus the stance
that one has towards another whom we do not
engage in a relationship with simply because he
or she will be of some use to us, but because we
respect them as having an inherent value independently of their use for us. Thus we respect
another person when we love them for their intrinsic value and not because of what they bring
us. By extension, we respect nature and enter into
an ethical relationship with it when we see it as
more than just fuel, electricity and lumber–when
we recognize its intrinsic value as an end in itself,
apart from anything that could be of use for us.
Such an attitude of respect is, however, the exception. Indeed, according to Jewish philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas, human beings are entirely
consumed by self-interest, i.e. by their own “perseverance in being”, or conatus. According to
Levinas, human beings are naturally selfish and
self-centered. Everything they do, everyone they
love is geared towards the purpose of self-preservation. In Otherwise than Being he states: “Being’s
interest takes dramatic form in egoisms struggling
with one another, each against all, in the multiplicity of allergic egoisms which are at war with
one another and are thus together”.3 The natural
tendency of men and women is thus, according to
Levinas, to pursue their own interest at the detriment of others’ self-interest–leading to a situation that Levinas names “war”. Respect is thus
not a natural virtue of humankind. “No one is
good voluntarily” says Levinas.4 And indeed, history has shown how for centuries people have not
only reduced nature to a means to their own selfinterest, but also other human beings. Descartes’
proclamation that the era of modernity was to
pave the way for man’s becoming “master and possessor of the universe,”5 omits to mention that this
same era is responsible for man’s becoming master
and possessor of other human beings through the
cruel act of bondage and slavery. Self-interest re-

mains the norm whether humankind deals with
the environment or with other human beings.
Yet our era is now sounding a call for environmental protection. But one might wonder how,
all of a sudden, humankind will find itself heeding this call. How, after centuries, milleniums, of
lives entirely consumed in self-interest, will men
and women suddenly come to realize the need to
respect nature as an end in itself apart from any
use it might have for them? And indeed, few are
the ones who are, today, genuinely responding to
the call for environmental protection. In a world
where respect for otherness apart from utilitarian
concerns holds no place and importance, it is difficult to imagine a major revolution towards environmental concerns. What is then to be done?
Should one frame environmental concerns with
threats of apocalyptic consequences? Should
environmentalists appeal to self-interest, to the
threat that our over-use of nature’s resources poses to the survival of our planet?
It seems to me that this appeal to self-interest
does not serve the environmental cause. It does
not yet touch on the root of the problem. Can
one appeal to that drive in human nature, i.e.,
self-interest, that is precisely at the origin of the
disrespect of nature, in order to foster a renewed
respect? This seems like a contradictory measure
which can only strengthen and confirm us in the
very self-interest that constitutes the root of environmental degradation. On the contrary, it is this
very self-interest that needs to be addressed if the
problem of environmental protection and a new
respect for nature is ever to be taken seriously.
But how indeed, is humankind to learn respect?
How is it to ever abandon so natural a tendency–
self-interest–for a tendency for which it has no
use for–respect?
According to Levinas, the respect of the environment, which puts aside self-interest, cannot be
taught apart from a concern for social justice. Indeed, it is the concern for social justice, i.e., concern
for another human being against all self-interest,
which, according to Levinas, will serve as the basis
of the awakening to a renewed respect for nature.
Nature cannot teach us this kind of respect, according to Levinas. A person seeped in self-interest will never learn from a tree the nature of reSHABBAT SHALOM 37

spect and of otherness. Respect is something that
is not learned from nature but from inter-human
relationships. According to Levinas, only another
human being is capable of putting my self-interest
on edge, only another human being is capable of
inverting my movement of possession and selfinterest: “The presence of the Other is equivalent
to this calling into question of my joyous possession of the world.”6 But one might wonder how
this inversion takes place. How does another human being come to place a limitation on my selfinterest? Is it through the use of force? Is this why
the inversion of self-interest cannot take place at
the foot of a tree? Because the tree remains placid
and intrinsically non-violent when faced with the
demands of my own self-interest?

and share its world with another thus allowing
for the welcoming, within its world, of genuine
alterity as an end in itself. This welcoming of the
destitute other within my own world allows for
a relationship where, for the first time, he or she
is not a means but an end, thus for a relationship defined by respect and not by utility. Thus
respect, according to Levinas, can only be taught
by another human being, it can only be taught
within a context of social justice. The tree cannot
on its own inspire respect. Only he or she who
has already learned the nature of respect through
an act of hospitality towards the destitute other,
can have respect for the tree. Only he or she who
has acquired a sense of social justice, of a shared
world, can care for environmental protection.

According to Levinas, the human other does not
limit my self-interest by posing a threat to it. The
human other does not invert my movement of
possession by violent means by taking what is
mine or threatening what is mine. The human
other inverts the movement of self-interest, simply by appearing in my world not as someone that
I could have a need for, but as someone who needs
me. The destitute other, who needs me, thus places
me, for the first time, in the presence of someone
who is not only of no use to me, but who needs
me, who needs my hospitality, who is pleading for
a place in my world. Thus, the destitute other not
only interrupts my movement of self-interest–in
that he offers me nothing which could be of use
to me–but opens up the possibility of an inversion
of that movement in an act of generosity–in that
he pleads for my help, for a place in my world: “To
recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To
recognize the Other is to give.”7 Thus the destitute
other is the only one who can awaken me to a relationship other than the means-ends movement of
self-interest. The tree cannot do so. The tree can
never invert my self-interest simply because the
tree can never plead for a place in my world.

Thus, environmental ethics is born out of social
justice, out of my willingness to share my world
with another another human being which is at the
very foundation of respect. Social justice and environmental protection are thus intrinsically connected. There can be no genuine environmental
ethics, no genuine respect for the environment if
one has not learned respect through the encounter with the destitute other, if one has not learned
to share one’s world with another. Environmental ethics is founded on a shared world, on the
concept of a shared world and will not succeed
as long as we don’t recognize this fundamental
premise. One thus cannot treat environmental
ethics apart from social justice. Environmental
ethics will rise out of a realization that we are responsible for each other beyond each other’s national borders or communities of faith, and out
of an initiative to recognize the other’s need for
us and our responsibility to them. Only when we
will have learned to tend the earth together, will
there again be, on the face of this earth, respect
for the environment.

Yet, if the destitute other can pose a limit on my
self-interest, he can never force its interruption.
The self must decide whether or not it chooses
to respond to the plea of the other and to share
part of its world with him or her. The self is free
to refuse to acknowledge the plea of the destitute
other and fall back into the closure of its own
world of possessions, or to acknowledge the plea
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